For 35 years following my tour of duty in Vietnam, I had little contact with other veterans, and none at all with members of my unit, 3rd Battalion, First Marines. In the 1990s, the growing efficiency of the Internet coincided with and fostered my own growing need to learn more about my own role and that of the Marines in the war. I began a tentative quest and eventually contacted Simon Gregory.
First Lt. Simon Gregory commanded Lima Company, 3/1—my company—at the time of Operation Utah, in early March, 1966. Previously, he had been Lima Company's executive officer, but just before Operation Utah he was temporarily promoted to company commander when Capt. James T. Sehulster was hospitalized.
Although Simon remembers me, I don't remember Simon. I had been transferred into Lima Company 13 days before Operation Utah, and spent most of my time with my 3rd Platoon squad. There was this, too: In the month since we had landed in Vietnam, I had witnessed a dozen incidents involving sudden death, severe wounds, and the torture of prisoners by Marines and South Vietnamese "Popular Force" militiamen. I think that I had begun to armour myself emotionally against such incidents: although I could not have articulated it at the time, I now realize that I could not risk making friends with Marines who might be dead or maimed in the next moment.
Even now, four decades later, I cannot easily reach out to people, and I am much more comfortable with casual rather than close relationships. It was not easy for me to make contact with Simon, but I am glad that I did. This seems to be a common experience for Vietnam combat veterans, most of whom in my experience are loners, as I am at heart.
Here is Simon's e-mail, dated 29 July 2001:
Dear Bob,
Thanks for your message. I fully understand how you feel about initiating contact with those of us that share our common experience. My involvement has been only with Lt. Walsh,* Lt. Cleaver and Lt. Crowley.** Both Walsh and Cleaver were wounded the same day you were. I lost 10 men and had 20 more wounded (you included). The N.Vietnamese suffered 33 official dead in combat with our Company, but I believe there were more that were not counted due to the massive carnage. Frankly, I did not worry about body counts and only provided cursory info to Battalion.
During the battle I captured an NVA soldier after jumping in to a shell crater with him. We were both surprised, but I had the advantage as I later discovered that he was wounded. It was a very definitive moment as I first believed that I would have to kill him, but since I had him by the front of his shirt with my left hand, I was unable to pull my pistol and cock it. This meant that all I had left was my combat knife. Although I drew the knife, it could see in his eyes that he had surrendered. I carried him down the hill to the improvised aid station the Corpsmen had set up for treating the wounded. Unfortunately, he died later that day. The NVA soldiers we engaged that day fought to the last man.
Your account of the battle indicated that we were ambushed.*** True enough, but this happened mainly because the ARVN Ranger unit on the top of the hill got word to us that they had secured the objective.... The so-called "secured" objective was actually occupied by a well dug in NVA Company. The very moment that the ARVN indicated contact with us was when we took our first assault from the NVA. My reaction was to give orders to return fire....
[Simon believes it is possible that the first casualties Lima Company inflicted were upon ARVN troops who were standing on top of the hill, with the NVA soldiers between us and them. Although ARVN units were in the immediate area, he does not recall seeing or hearing from them for the duration of the battle, nor do I.]
...After the initial bursts of fire that morning, it was all that I could do to maintain a cohesive presence on the battlefield. The wounded were on need of attention, the dead had to be removed, the enemy had to be dealt with as I determined that there was no way to disengage without taking more casualties. The urge to flee affected some of us initially I am sure, but it soon became obvious that we all knew the course of action required and stood our ground. I had one deserter that day, which was a difficult situation to deal with on top of everything else. My own mental state had put me past the fear stage quite early on and I essentially was comfortable with the fact that I could die at any moment. A calmness came over me that allowed me to function with effectiveness. Some have described it as an "out of body experience". Needless to say the emotions, sights, sounds and smells of that battle still remain with me and rarely a day goes by that I don't recall the experience.
It was not all bad by any means, but it is surely a hard way to get an education. My tour ended in late August of 66. However, my wife and I returned a couple of years ago on our own two person tour. I have to say it was a wonderful experience. We visited Hanoi, Hue and DaNang, where I was stationed with the Battalion from April through August 66. Our area of responsibility ran from just South of the airstrip down to Hoi An. The Marble Mountain complex was included and it was there that I had a lot of contact with the civilian population, In addition to being the Battalion S-2 [Intelligence officer] I was also responsible for civil affairs. This offered me another view of the war that many did not get.
Enough for now.... Needless to say, I'd like to know how and what you are doing. I turn 60 tomorrow and we have 4 children and 2 1/2 grandchildren.
Kindest personal regards,
Simon
* 1st Lt. Daniel M Walsh III, 2nd Platoon Leader.
** 2nd Lt. Stephen B. Crowley III, 1st Platoon Leader
*** Until I received Simon's e-mail, I had always assumed that the Marines were unaware of the communist presence on Hill 50, and that the attack had been a classic ambush—and a Marine Corps snafu. Obviously, it was not that cut-and-dried. The Marines had been told that the hill had been secured by ARVN troops, but that word apparently didn't filter down to the squad level. It is likely that the ARVN troops themselves were not aware that Hill 50 had been heavily fortified by the communists over the past several months, and that they were waiting for us.